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Abstract 
The National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom (UK) is currently going through a period of 
vast reform, with guidelines for that reform set out in the NHS plan [1].  As part of the plan a system 
for electronic prescribing of drugs should be available by 2004.  The main objective of this 
transformation is to remove many of the frailties of the present paper based system, in terms of fraud, 
inefficiency and administrative workload.   However, any proposed system must also uphold the 
tradition of patient choice with respect to dispensing pharmacy, and must be reliable, robust and of 
good performance if it is to have any hope of gaining acceptance from the health professionals 
involved. 
In this paper we set out our proposed electronic prescription processing system design, with the 
emphasis placed firmly on performance, scalability and security.  In the early sections we aim to 
demonstrate just why an electronic prescribing system is required, by looking at the present system and 
its frailties.  We also identify factors that are important in the development of any future system.  Our 
proposed system is then detailed, along with its anticipated benefits and disadvantages. 
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The UK NHS came into being in 1948 and since that time has provided fixed or zero cost medical 
services to all UK citizens.  One of the fixed cost medical services is the UK drug prescription system 
controlled by a government organisation called the Prescription Pricing Authority (PPA).  The NHS 
also provides free prescriptions to a large proportion of its clients in the form of exemptions for reasons 
such as age.  With the recent production of a National Plan of Reform for the NHS [1] came a goal to 
adopt Electronic Prescribing by 2004 to replace the current paper based system. Paper prescriptions, in 
one form or another, were introduced in 1948 at the outset of the NHS 
We define Electronic Prescription Processing (EPP) as the electronic transmission and processing of 
medical information contained within medicinal prescriptions through all components of the 
prescription system, from the initial prescribing of the drugs, through dispensation to the patient, to the 
eventual close of transaction at some prescription-processing agent1. 
In this paper we set out our proposed electronic prescription processing system design, with the 
emphasis firmly placed on performance, scalability and security.  In the early sections we aim to 
demonstrate just why an electronic prescribing system is required, by looking at the present paper 
based system and its failures.  We also identify factors that are important in the development of any 
future system.  Our proposed system is then detailed, along with its anticipated benefits and 
disadvantages. 
Prescription Processing – The Present System 
To explain the present prescribing system in the UK NHS (depicted pictorially in Figure 1) it is best to 
describe a general case scenario of a patient requiring unrestricted drugs (e.g. not drugs like Methadone 
for which there are UK controls on prescribing) on a visit to their family doctor.  After assessment of 
the medicinal requirements of the patient the doctor writes or prints off a prescription on a special form 
called an FP10 [6]. FP10 prescription forms come in different sizes and colours according to its 
intended use e.g. by General Medical Practitioners, by General Dental Practitioners, or for controlled 
drugs etc. The doctor then signs the form by hand in ink.   
                                                                 
1 The processing agent is optional.  The UK NHS uses a governmental processing agent in the form of 
the PPA. 
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The patient takes this paper prescription to any pharmacy in the country and signs it to claim any 
exemptions from prescription charges that they are entitled to.   The drugs are dispensed to the patient 
and the Pharmacist either takes the standard prescription charge from the patient or performs checks on 
their exemption. The form remains with the Pharmacist until the end of the month.  After this time the 
forms are sent in a batch to the PPA who deals with the administration of the system.  The PPA 
provides payment to the pharmacies for the drugs dispensed and also checks claims for exemption 
where no evidence has been shown to the Pharmacist. 
To gain a background insight into the present prescribing system, visits have been made to a number of 
local Pharmacists and the PPA.  These visits have included tours to see how the present prescription 
processing system works in practice and discussions on the implications of electronic prescribing to the 
current business processes. 
Problems with the Present System 
Fraud 
From current government documents [4] and information in the media [8] it is estimated that 
prescription fraud costs the NHS of the order of £70-100 million a year.  The fraud is perpetuated at 
many different tiers of the system from the patient to the dispenser of the drugs and comes in a variety 
of forms.  Two examples of these are described below: 
4. Prescriptions Batched 




2. Patient Hands 
Prescription to 
Pharmacist (Maybe 
signed to claim 
exemption) 
3. Drugs Dispensed to Patient, 
money to dispenser if the 
patient is not exempt 
5. Prescriptions Processed 
and payment sent back to 
Dispenser 
 
Figure 1 An Example Of The Present Paper Based Prescribing System 
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Prescription Pad Theft – 
“a deputising locum obtained blank prescriptions from a practice and then scanned them into a 
computer along with a genuine signature of the GP. The computer was then used to generate 
prescriptions for high cost drugs which were obtained from a number of chemists” [9] 
Prescription pads are stolen from GP practices and bogus prescriptions are written or printed out on 
them.  Current countermeasures involve the recording of prescription pad identification numbers and 
issuing warnings to pharmacies.  In a busy pharmacy though a check against these numbers will be 
very rare.  The only hope of detection really is in local pharmacies where they know the format of local 
GP's scripts and can recognise the signatures and therefore can identify differences. 
Altered prescription dispensation –  
“Pharmacists have made significant amounts of money by substituting an expensive drug with a 
cheaper alternative, but the claim is made for the more expensive one. Alternatively, money can be 
made by making up prescriptions slightly short of the correct quantity, or indeed, by adding items to 
prescriptions or changing the amounts of the drugs prescribed”[9] 
When making up the items for dispensation, Pharmacist’s may simply give to patients different 
quantities from those stated on the prescriptions.  The surplus amounts of drugs can then either be sold 
on the black market or dispensed to other patients. 
Measures have been introduced into the present system to counter fraud and the actual amount lost by 
fraud is diminishing [4], however, the integration of electronic prescribing is seen as another way of 
countering prescription fraud. 
Data Integrity 
It is estimated that 40 percent of all prescriptions in the USA require rework [45] with 5% of these 
requiring a phone call to the physician.  We would suggest that in the UK the percentage would be of a 
similar proportion.  EPP wouldn’t completely remove the need for phone call clarification but with 
electronic scripts instead of often illegible hand-written scripts the requirement for calls should be 
reduced.  Electronic scripts suggest that each prescriber will be using an electronic prescribing system.  
The many existing electronic prescribing systems will help with formulating the prescription so that the 
number of errors produced when generating the prescription should also be reduced.  This will also 
help in the fight to reduce the number of hospital admissions caused by medication errors, recently 
stated in the UK to be one patient in every twenty admissions [20]. 
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Administrative Workload 
Each year the PPA processes an increasing number of prescriptions, with the figure reaching 578 
million prescription items in 2001 [3] [25]. All of these come in batches each month from dispensaries 
all over the UK.  Each script has to be input into the authorities computer system in order to calculate 
payment.  The administrative burden is tremendous requiring a large number of data operators 
performing labour intensive, repetitive data input tasks that often result in entry errors.  Indeed in a 
previous project we found input errors to be a significant factor in duplicate entry data systems [11].  
The introduction of EPP should allow for a large reduction in the number of paper scripts processed by 
the PPA and a reduction in the amount of time taken to process the prescriptions accumulated over 
each monthly period.  Indeed many pharmacists believe that the introduction of EPP will lead to a 
reduced payment period for dispensed drugs. 
Efficiency 
In general the present prescription processing system is reasonably efficient up until the actual 
processing of the prescriptions at the PPA.  Prescribers and dispensers have particularly efficient 
internal practices that have evolved over a number of years. It is difficult to see how computerisation, 
especially a national prescription processing system, could bring any significant efficiency benefits to 
them.  In order to be accepted by these stakeholders, one of the main objectives of any EPP system 
must be to ensure a lack of degradation of the efficiency of present working practices.  From UK 
research conducted by Kember Associates [12] 60% of Pharmacists believed that the introduction of 
electronic prescribing would lead to timesavings within the dispensation process with 55% believing it 
would lead to shorter patient waiting times for their dispensed prescription.  Such high expectations 
place additional demands on the implementation of EPP.  One area where benefits may accrue from 
electronic processing could be improvements in the handling of repeat prescriptions. 
Patient Exemptions / Identification 
At present the emphasis for checking patient exemption from NHS charges and checking of the 
patient’s identification is placed firmly on the Pharmacist.  This weak control helps people who claim 
fraudulent benefits.  It also puts increased pressure/stress on the Pharmacist by introducing 
confrontation into their working lives, since they have to ask patients questions such as “Have you got 
evidence of you age?” and “Can you prove that you have an exemption?” These types of questions 
automatically alienate their customers, indeed in some cases exemptions from charges may not be 
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claimed because of customers reluctance to prove their circumstances or from lack of knowledge that 
they can claim exemption. 
Electronic Prescription Processing Systems 
Applications designed to electronically generate prescriptions have existed for a number of years with a 
large majority of practitioners in the UK now producing printed prescription forms [3].  However, no 
system exists in the UK for the Electronic Transmission of Prescriptions (ETP) to pharmacies and the 
PPA.  Prior to the commencement of this study Pharmed [13] had planned for the trial introduction of 
one such system within the NHS.  Hospital systems have been trialed within the Wirral Hospital trust 
[14] and the British government has demonstrated its commitment to the adoption of ETP, firstly by 
funding individual projects [15][16], and then in 2001, by approving the proposals of 3 commercial 
consortia to mount self-financed pilots [5]. 
Electronic prescribing is not just a UK phenomenon.  Electronic prescription systems [17][18][19] 
linked to pharmacies exist in the USA but these are in small cluster groups of selected pharmacies and 
prescribers all signed up to the same system provider.  Prescriptions within these systems are sent 
either by fax or electronic mail.  In Denmark it is estimated that 35 per cent of prescriptions are sent 
electronically [20] and a project [21] on the impact of electronic prescription systems has also been 
carried out.  In Germany research has taken place into the transfer of prescriptions and health 
information on a patient smart card [22]. 
The present UK Prescription Processing system generates “550 million pieces of paper per year 
between GP, Pharmacy and Pricing systems” [23], countless numbers of phone calls checking 
prescription validation and has a patient population of around sixty million.  When these scaling factors 
are coupled with reliability, security, efficiency and are set against a changing background of patient 
identifying factors2 the complexity of the problem begins to materialise. 
Design of an Electronic Prescription Processing System 
The basic system design consis ts of the three different ‘users’ of the system (Prescribers, Dispensers 
and the PPA) calling a common Application Programming Interface (API) called the Electronic 
Prescription Processing (EPP) API.  The actual prescriptions within the system are stored as digitally 
                                                                 
2 The UK NHS is rapidly changing its practices to deal more effectively with data protection laws 
whereby restrictions on identifying factors for patient information are now being imposed. E.g. not 
identified by patient name. 
 
 7
signed certificates within a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory [24]. LDAP was 
chosen because it is designed to store digitally signed certificates and is a basic component of a Public 
Key Infrastructure (see later). The prescription directory is distributed between the regions for 
scalability reasons, as a centralised directory would be required to deal with upwards of 500,000,000 
prescriptions a year (see the directory sizing section).  Other directories also exist. A patient directory 
holds patient details, such as their NHS number and any particular exemptions they may have, and a 
national NHS directory contains the details of prescribers, dispensers and regulatory bodies.   
The electronic prescription is encapsulated in a construct called an attribute certificate [26] and this 
structure contains the electronic signature of the prescriber.  The security of the system is described in 
greater detail in the following section of this paper. 
To explain the design in detail it is  again useful to go through a typical scenario.  The patient would 
visit their GP and explain their illness. The GP would search through his local prescribing application 
database for the patient’s electronic record.  This record would contain the patient’s NHS number and 
other details such as age and previous prescriptions etc. The GP prepares the prescription on his PC, 
using existing electronic prescribing software that contains details of all current drugs recognised by 
the NHS. When finished, the patient optionally may be asked if they would like to name a pharmacy 
that they wish to go to for the prescribed drugs. However neither the GP nor the patient is required to 
do this, as freedom of choice of pharmacy is retained. The advantage of choosing a pharmacy at this 
stage is that the pharmacy can be notified in advance, so that the prescription can be dispensed prior to 
patient arrival, thereby reducing their waiting time. The electronic prescription is generated within the 
application, and the GP is asked to digitally sign it. The process of digital signing only requires the GP 
to enter a secret password or PIN and so is no more difficult than hand signing. The rest of the digital 
signing process is carried out automatically by the application.  The system then connects to the local 
regional LDAP directory and the prescription is stored as a unique entry, referenced by its Prescription 
Unique Identifier (PUID). The doctor gives the patient a print out “comfort” slip that contains the 
patient’s name, NHS number and list of drugs prescribed and also a barcode containing the PUID.  The 
comfort slip denoting the prescription is merely a confirmation note, which is used for fast lookup by 
pharmacies using a barcode scanner. It can also be used as a pharmacy picking3 list.   
                                                                 
3 Pharmacists often carry the paper prescriptions around their pharmacy with them in order to know 
which drugs to dispense.  Therefore a completely computerised system would not be accepted by a 
large majority of them unless a paper copy of the prescription was available to them. 
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The prescription is stored in one of the many regional LDAP directories, depending upon which GP the 
patient visited.  Each pharmacy system is capable of contacting all of these directories, so that if the 
patient travels between prescribing and dispensing he is not disadvantaged. The patient visits a 
pharmacy of choice and gives the Dispenser the comfort slip or their name and address. If the latter, the 
Dispenser will have to search the regional LDAP directories looking for the patient’s prescription. If 
the comfort slip is given the barcode uniquely identifies the patient and prescription within the correct 
regional directory, thereby speeding up retrieval.  The prescription is retrieved, decoded and displayed 
then the Prescriber’s signature is verified.  Displaying the prescription before signature verification 
allows the Dispenser to start dispensing the prescription instead of waiting for the verification 
(checking) of the signature to complete.  In the rare cases where the signature verification fails (which 
means that the prescription has been tampered with or an error has occurred) the Dispenser will be 
notified before they finally dispense the drugs to the patient.  In the vast majority of cases the signature 
should prove to be valid and therefore it is better to check the signature during a period of low 
processing while the Dispenser is picking the drugs for the prescription.  The Dispenser then adds to 
the prescription the dispensation information and digitally signs the updated document and stores it 
back in the LDAP directory from whence it came. 
When the PPA requests all the dispensed prescriptions they would scan each of the regional directories.  
All dispensed prescriptions will be retrieved and verification would then take place after retrieval so as 
not to slow down the retrieval process. Once retrieved, the PPA would then delete or move to backup 
the original prescriptions and the dispensed prescriptions from the directory.   
This is a basic summary of the system design and describes a typical prescription transaction.  There 
are many other factors that have been considered in the research, for example patient signing, 
controlled drugs distribution and the problems caused by integration of the electronic system with the 
paper based system. Some of these are detailed in following sections of this paper. 
EPP Security Requirements 
Medical professionals have a legal obligation to protect the confidentiality of patient information [27] 
[31].  Therefore the unprotected transfer of plain textual prescriptions across insecure networks is 
clearly not an option.  It is also necessary to ensure that only medical professionals involved in the 
electronic prescription processing can access the system.  Secure authentication (assurance of identity) 
and authorisation (confirmation of privileges) of such professionals is consequently a requirement of 
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the system.  Further, how do we know that a third party has not subsequently altered a prescription 
after generation?  Consequently, we are required to provide an integrity mechanism (assurance that the 
prescription has not been altered) to protect the prescription against modification. Finally, the system 
should be able to ensure that repudiation of origin (denial of ownership) is difficult to achieve. 
EPP Security Technologies 
Authenticity, integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality are all security services that can be 
provided directly or indirectly by a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [28].  So to provide all the security 
services required by an Electronic Prescription Processing System it is expected that a PKI will be 
necessary.  We have used the PKI provided by Entrust Inc. to set up our demonstrable version of the 
system but any PKI could be used in place of this.   
Confidentiality is provided by cryptography. Symmetric cryptographic systems operate on a basis of a 
shared token (key).  Both parties in a symmetric key transaction have the same encryption and 
decryption key or have keys that can be easily derived from each other.  Such systems have been in 
existence for thousands of years ranging from early examples such as the Caesar Cipher [34] to more 
modern representations such as DES [35], CAST-128 [36] and AES [30].  Symmetric ciphers possess 
some very desirable qualities such as speed of encryption/decryption (encoding/decoding of 
information) and small key sizes. However they also have a disadvantage, which is how to distribute 
the initial key to the communicating parties. This becomes a significant problem when large numbers 
of users are involved.   
The principles of asymmetric cryptography have only recently been determined through the work of 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in the mid 1970’s [37].  Asymmetric cryptographic exchanges 
require the production of separate keys for encryption and decryption where the keys cannot be 
determined from one another. One key, the private key, is only known to one party, whilst the second 
key, the public key, can be made available to anyone.    The public key can be published in a key server 
or can be sent directly to the remote parties involved in the transactions.  In order to know that a public 
key is genuine and has not been tampered with, the public key can be published as part of a data 
structure called an X.509 public key certificate [26].  This certificate contains information about the 
public key (e.g. what cryptographic functions the key can be used for and its validity period), the owner 
of the key pair, and details about the certification authority (CA) that is attesting to this ownership.  
The whole data structure is digitally signed by the CA. Usually validity periods for public key 
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certificates are fairly long (of the order of years) because the authentication and issuing process can be 
quite lengthy. Consequently you wouldn’t want to be continually changing your electronic identity (as 
identified by the public key certificate). When sending encrypted messages via a PKI both symmetric 
and asymmetric encryption technologies are used.  The message is encrypted using a new one-off 
symmetric key, to gain the benefit of encryption speed, then the symmetric key is encrypted using the 
public key of the recipient, in order to confidentially distribute the key to the recipient. 
A relatively new development in the world of cryptography is the introduction of attribute certificates.  
These certificates allow for the allocation of 
privileges (or indeed any attributes) to an 
electronic entity.  An X.509 attribute 
certificate [26], see Figure 2, consists of a data 
structure called Attribute Certificate 
Information, see Figure 3, which contains details about the issuer, the holder, the times of validity etc. 
as well as the embedded attribute(s).  In our EPP design the prescription is stored as an attribute within 
Attribute Certificate Information, the holder is the patient and the issuer is the prescriber.  This 
Attribute Certificate Information structure is then digitally signed by the issuer and the signature 
method used and value of the signature are all amalgamated together to form the attribute certificate. 
  
Attribute certificates have the properties of integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation, but not 
confidentiality. In many present systems, encrypted links are used to provide confidentiality during 
transfer over the Internet, using mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [39] or Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) [40].  Our design similarly allows for encrypted links between all associated 
entities.  However, we can also provide for the transfer of encrypted prescriptions without the need for 
a protected link.  In the latter case all parties would need to be specified prior to encryption (thereby 
Signed 
Attribute Certificate Information 
Embedded Attribute(s) 
Figure 2 Attribute Certificate 
Attribute Certificate Info ::= SEQUENCE { 
 version   AttCertVersion, 
 holder   Holder, 
 issuer   Issuer, 
 signature  AlgorithmIdentifier, 
 attrCertValidityPeriod AttCertValidityPeriod, 
 attributes  SEQUENCE of Attribute, 
 issuerUniqueID  UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
 extensions  Extensions OPTIONAL 
} 
Figure 3Attribute Certificate Information 
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requiring the patient to choose which pharmacy they wish to pick up the prescription from).  The 
prescription would be encrypted so that only the chosen recipients (the pharmacist, the PPA, the 
prescriber and optionally the patient) can subsequently have access to it. Later in our research we plan 
to evaluate the performance and usability of these two alternative encryption methods (encrypted links 
vs. encrypted prescriptions). 
Authorisation / Privilege Management 
Other project work within our security research group at Salford (http:\\sec.isi.salford.ac.uk) has been 
focused on building a Privilege Management Infrastructure for Authorisation purposes (PERMIS) [41].  
PERMIS is a trust management infrastructure according to the definition given by Blaze [2]. A trust 
management system defines privileges, actions and the various parties involved, and a policy that says 
which parties are trusted to perform which actions on which target objects. A decision engine is built 
that enforces the policy. The PERMIS infrastructure is general purpose and caters for the granting and 
verification of privileges in relation to any electronic transaction. The infrastructure is  role based, 
whereby the various parties are allocated roles, and the roles are given privileges. The roles are stored 
in attribute certificates. We were able to integrate PERMIS into our design for EPP, to provide for the 
secure authorisation of the various parties (e.g. the role of Doctor is allocated to a GP, and Doctors are 
given the privilege to prescribe). This also allows us to provide a more effective solution for handling 
patient exemptions to prescription charges. 
Prescriber /Dispenser Privileges 
The overseer of the UK NHS, which to all intents and purposes is the Secretary of State for Health in 
the UK Government, would generate and electronically sign a PERMIS policy stipulating who can 
carry out which actions in the Prescription Processing System4.  For example the policy might state that 
the General Medical Council is trusted to allocate the role of Doctor to people, and that anyone with the 
role of Doctor is allowed to prescribe.  Therefore a signatory member of the General Medical Council 
indirectly gives all General Practitioners in the UK NHS the right to prescribe when they are issued 
with a Doctor role attribute certificate.  When the GP is generating a prescription the EPP API calls the 
PERMIS decision engine to determine if the GP is authorised to do so according to the rules laid down 
in the policy. As long as the prescriber has the role of Doctor, they will have been granted permission 
                                                                 
4 It need not be the Secretary of State himself who signs the policy, but could be anyone authorised by 
him. The system would be told who the authorised trusted person is. 
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to prescribe and they will be allowed access to the operation to generate an electronic prescription and 
send it to the prescription directory for storage.  In the case of Dispensers, they are given the role of 
Pharmacist by a trusted professional from the Royal Pharmaceutical Society. The policy would state 
that anyone with a role of Pharmacist has the privilege to retrieve prescriptions from the prescription 
directory and to view them, and then subsequently to submit the dispensed prescription back to the 
prescription directory. The EPP API will call the PERMIS decision engine in order to enforce these 
rules. 
Exemption Handling 
Exemptions within the NHS can be for a wide variety of purposes and can be for varying amounts of 
time.  For example: 
after the age of 65 or before the age of 16 patients are exempt from all prescription charges 
or  
while patients are on national supported benefit they are exempt from all charges. 
Within our design for electronic prescriptions we propose that these exemptions would become patient 
roles, and the policy would state what privileges these roles conferred. The roles, in the form of 
attribute certificates, could either be stored within a national system or on a smart card issued to and 
carried by the patient. This will alleviate the dispenser from the job of checking for proof of exemption.  
Approved bodies would generate the exemption roles for certain validity periods.  For example, after 
the age of 65 patients could be issued with an exemption attribute certificate for the rest of their lives or 
every set period of time whilst on benefit an exemption certificate could be issued to a claimant e.g. 
quarterly or annually. The EPP API calls the PERMIS decision engine in order to determine and 
enforce eligibility for free prescriptions. 
Specification of the Electronic Prescription 
It is essential to ensure that any electronic prescription processing system is optimised to provide the 
most efficient system possible, due to the limited time available to prescribers and dispensers, and the 
volume of prescriptions issued annually.  Therefore it is imperative to ensure that the prescription is 
specified in a language and form which provides the most efficient data transfer possible.  As part of 
our research into the design of an EPP system we have produced a comparison of two such data 
transfer syntaxes  [43], Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [32] with its Basic Encoding Rules 
(BER) [33] and eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [38].  The comparison was prompted by the 
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impending adoption of XML as the protocol for UK electronic government services including ETP.  
We compared the transfer of three different sizes of data structure specified in both transfer syntaxes, 
all with and without data security (digital signatures).  We found ASN.1 BER to be the most efficient 
transfer syntax by approximately an order of magnitude when used to specify a digitally signed 
prescription [43]. Earlier research by our group [7] [11] causes us to believe that performance will be a 
critical factor in EPP system success. 
Directory Sizing 
With over 500 million prescriptions to process a year, we believe that a national centralised 
prescription store will be an expensive option for such a large scale EPP system.  Performance of such 
a centralised system would be major delimiting factor in the introduction of EPP.  It would also be a 
central point of failure. Therefore we propose a distributed prescription store as depicted in figure 4. 
 
The system comprises one centralised directory that holds details of all the NHS participants. Another 
holds details of all patients and their exemptions (although this also could be distributed or replaced by 
each patient having their own smart card). The prescription directory is distributed throughout the NHS 
regions. Precisely how distributed is a configuration option but we suggest at a maximum each 
directory should hold no more than 10 million prescriptions (taking into account a prescription’s expiry 
period).  In fact our design is such that in the extreme the prescription directory could even be 
distributed down to servers within each prescriber’s surgery.  However, we are not proposing this, as it 
would cause large problems in terms of system administration for each surgery.  We are currently 
experimenting with different distribution scenarios in order to determine an optimal distribution policy. 
NHS Structure 
 Regional Structures 
  Prescribers 
  Dispensers 
 National Structures 
  e.g. PPA 
Prescriptions 





Partially Dispensed Prescriptions 
Dispensed Prescriptions 
Regional Authority A
Regional Authority B etc… 
Figure 4 Directory Structure 
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Data Protection 
The UK NHS is going through a period of data protection review with recommendations outlined 
within the Caldicott Report [42].  The key issue is how much personal information should practitioners 
at different levels within the NHS see for each patient.  Everybody in the UK has a NHS identification 
number and in transaction data flows it is recommended that this be used instead of the patient’s name.  
There are other systems that enable practitioners to search using the patient’s name and address to find 
their NHS identification number, but the use of the NHS ID provides a suitable level of abstraction.  
Our EPP system is designed to use NHS IDs in line with the Caldicott recommendations. Our system 
also allows for prescription data to be encrypted within the directory store should the patient request it, 
or policy require it, as long as the patient chooses a pharmacist to decrypt it or the patient has their own 
NHS personal smart card holding their decryption key. 
Patient Identification / Controlled Drugs 
Within the UK NHS certain medications are designated controlled drugs.  These drugs are subject to 
the prescription requirements of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations (1985).  They are drugs that are 
likely to cause addiction, or for which there is concern about abuse, for example the heroin substitute 
methadone.  For these types of drugs it is extremely important that they are prescribed and dispensed to 
the right people. One solution could be that a photograph of the individual requiring controlled drugs 
could be stored either within the patient’s directory entry or on their smart card.  This would provide 
prescribers and dispensers with a point of reference for patient identification. The photograph need not 
necessarily be of the person’s face. It could be of their hand written signature or some other unique 
defining feature. 
Expedited Prescriptions 
In the present processing system patients can take their prescription to any dispensary and receive their 
designated drugs subject to the drugs being in stock.  The government wishes patients to have the same 
choice when they have been given an electronic prescription.  This will help to ensure that there is no 
monopolisation of either a local dispensary market or the national market.  However, patients may like 
to be able to designate in advance a pharmacy where they will pick up their prescription. This allows 
our system to send an electronic notification that a prescription is awaiting dispensation directly to the 
pharmacy (via secure email S/MIME [44]).  This will enable pharmacies to dispense a prescription 
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before the patient arrives leading to patients spending less time waiting for their medication to be 
dispensed. 
Proposed Benefits and Problems with our Design 
We believe that the adoption of electronic prescribing within the NHS will cause a multitude of 
different problems for system designers to overcome.  Our system will counter a large proportion of the 
fraud within the NHS, for example the stealing of prescription forms, fraudulent signatures and altered 
prescriptions.  However some fraud will still be hard to overcome such as the dispensation of 
fraudulent amounts of drugs or conspiracy between a prescriber and dispenser.  The electronic system 
may also provide the capability for new fraud, caused for example by the theft of electronic signature 
tokens or authentication mechanisms (e.g. passwords). An operational system would require a secure 
transaction logging system for audit purposes, a facility we have not yet built. 
The current paper system is optimised for prescribers and dispensers, so the introduction of any new 
system might bring an expected slowdown during the initial period whilst operators become used to 
working with the new system.  Therefore performance optimisation before roll out is a major aspect of 
any design. 
Overall the main benefits and drawbacks of the system, apart from a reduction of fraud, can be 
categorised according to the different user groups of the system (Patients, Prescribers, Dispensers and 
the PPA).  
Patients  
They will not perceive any immediate difference in the new system apart from the different design of 
the paper prescription (with barcode). However, they will find that by electing to go to a particular 
pharmacist, their dispensed prescription may be ready on arrival. Also the new system will deal with 
some patient exemptions automatically via the use of the PERMIS API and built in privileges.  
Therefore these patients will benefit from not having to prove their exemption at the pharmacy. 
Prescribers  
Prescribers are the least inconvenienced by the new system. They should see little difference in the new 
system, except that now they will have to enter a password or PIN number5 in order for the electronic 
prescription to be digitally signed.  They may also notice some performance degradation of their 
                                                                 
5 Other forms of authentication could also be used and indeed may be recommended, as password 
schemes can easily be overcome [10]. 
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Prescribing application as the prescription is digitally signed and sent to the directory. An electronic 
system also allows additional modules to be built, for example, to notify prescribers when a 
prescription has actually been dispensed, a feature not available in paper based prescribing. Finally, an 
enhanced user interface (not provided by our project) should be able to store the written prescriptions 
and automatically reschedule them for repeat prescribing. Since repeat prescriptions account for 70% 
of GP prescriptions, this should be a significant realisable benefit from electronic prescribing (although 
it is recognised that some systems already have this feature today). 
Dispensers   
Dispensers are the high-risk users in this system. They may or may not benefit from electronic 
prescriptions depending upon the functionality of their current system. Scanning in prescriptions should 
be quicker than entering prescription details by hand, but the electronic prescription may still require 
some drug selection and data entering. Also the speed of retrieval from the regional directory will be a 
critical success factor we believe. Dispensers should benefit from system knowledge of patient 
exemptions, and from the prescriptions going straight to the PPA.  Hopefully this will lead to less 
conflict with patients and earlier payments for their services.  It should also allow additional modules to 
be built to correlate payments with dispensed drugs, something the dispensers are not able to do today.  
They simply have to trust that the PPA gives them all their dues.  However, for some prescribing, as 
doctors migrate to the electronic system, and as a backup for electronic system failure, paper based 
prescription processing is expected to be required for some time (maybe forever). Consequently 
dispensers will have to work with the two systems running in parallel, which will bring its own 
problems and frustrations. 
The PPA 
The PPA is likely to be the main beneficiary from electronic prescriptions. The reduction in the amount 
of paper documents they have to handle will lead to reduced transcription administration at the PPA 
and automation of their business processes. It will also allow them to better forecast trends in drug 
prescribing, and plan for the future. Apart from the reduction of fraud, this could be one of the main 
benefits of Electronic Prescription Processing to the NHS. 
The system at the moment is optimised for handling paper prescriptions, so the introduction of a new 
system with its expected teething problems is going to cause negative effects in the interim period until 
operators become used to working with the new system.  Further, the PPA will have to operate paper 
 17 
and electronic systems in parallel for a significant period of time (if not forever) whilst GPs migrate to 
the new system, and as a fallback mechanism in times of crisis.  
Integration with End Systems 
At the moment there exists a large number of disparate applications used to process prescriptions.  The 
NHS and indeed many large organisations refuse to be ‘tied-in’ to any one system provider.  These 
applications provide a wide variety of functions for their users such as prescribing help and stock 
control.  A number of these services are already provided by links into separate Application 
Programming Interfaces (API) provided by third party organisations such as links into the Prodigy [29] 
system for primary care prescribers. Therefore we have built an API in Java that is designed to 
facilitate the introduction of electronic prescription processing into any existing electronic prescribing 
application in use in the UK NHS.  The API itself is easy to use, and will be detailed in a subsequent 
research paper. We will also be detailing performance results once laboratory tests are completed. 
Summary 
Our system design has the capability for transforming the paper based prescription system of the UK 
NHS into a secure computerised system.  The API for the design described in this paper has been 
implemented by our research group and built into a prototype system.  Integration of the EPP API into 
operational GP and pharmacist end user systems must be done by the current suppliers of these 
systems. 
Overall the main benefits apart from reduction of fraud can be categorised by the different user groups 
of the system (Patients, Prescribers, Dispensers and the PPA).  It is believed that as long as the system 
is easy to use and performance matches or exceeds that of the current system then the user groups will 
not experience any significant adverse effects in the new system, and may experience real benefits. 
Patients and dispensers should benefit from some exemptions being handled automatically.   
Dispensers should benefit from the prescriptions going straight to the PPA and hopefully this will lead 
to earlier payments for their services. Add on features like the feedback of dispensed prescriptions to 
prescribers and the correlation of payments received with claims made by the dispensers, should 
provide users with a higher quality of information. The main beneficiaries however will be the PPA, 
with a significantly reduced administrative load, and the NHS with a reduction in fraud. 
The emphasis of our research has been to design a scalable, secure system for the transport of 
electronic prescriptions between all the parties involved. Over the next year we will be concentrating 
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on performance optimisation, plus scalability tests to ensure that the system will have the capacity to 
cater for the entire population of the UK.  From these results and simulation tests in the laboratory we 
should be able to make some interesting conclusions on the adoption of ETP/EPP within the UK NHS. 
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